And so the debate around back-doors in cryptography bubbles up again [here]:
The statement has been signed by the UK, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand and the United States governments. It starts out with great intensions, with a grand statement:
“Encryption is an existential anchor of trust in the digital world and we do not support counter-productive and dangerous approaches that would materially weaken or limit security systems”
But, the tension around backdoors in cryptography soon comes to the surface with:
- sets out the severe impact on public safety where end-to-end encryption is implemented in a way that precludes all access to content, even to investigate the most serious crimes, including terrorism, and child sexual exploitation and abuse.
- calls on tech companies to work with governments to find solutions to ensure the safety of our citizens, without eroding user privacy or cyber security.
And we have the Catch-22 situation around wanting strong end-to-end encryption, but asking tech companies to allow access. I have no answers for this delemia, so, here’s a bit on an analysis from the last time this topic came to the surface: